90-769 -- OPINION v. GEARY

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

No. 90-769

[June 17, 1991]

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners seek review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that Article II, 6(b) of the California Constitution violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Section 6(b) reads: "No political party or party cen- tral committee may endorse, support, or oppose a candidate for nonpartisan office." Its companion provision, 6(a), pro- vides that "[a]ll judicial, school, county, and city offices shall be nonpartisan."

I In view of our determination that the case is nonjustici able, the identity of the parties has crucial relevance. Peti- tioners are the City and County of San Francisco, its Board of Supervisors, and certain local officials. The individual re- spondents are 10 registered voters residing in the City and County of San Francisco. They include the chairman and three members of the San Francisco Republican County Cen- tral Committee and one member of the San Francisco Demo- cratic County Central Committee. Election Action, an asso- ciation of voters, is also a respondent, but it asserts no interest in relation to the issues before us different from that of the individual voters. Hence, we need not consider it further.

Respondents filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Their third cause of action challenged 6(b) and petitioners' acknowl- edged policy, based on that provision, of deleting any refer- ences to a party endorsement from the candidate statements included in voter pamphlets. As we understand it, petition- ers print the pamphlets and pay the postage required to mail them to voters. The voter pamphlets contain statements prepared by candidates for office and arguments submitted by interested persons concerning other measures on the bal- lot. The complaint sought a declaration that Article II, 6 was unconstitutional and an injunction preventing petition- ers from editing candidate statements to delete references to party endorsements.

The District Court granted summary judgment for re- spondents on their third cause of action, declaring 6(b) un- constitutional and enjoining petitioners from enforcing it. 708 F. Supp. 278 (ND Cal. 1988). The court entered judg- ment on this claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce- dure 54(b), and petitioners appealed. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, 880 F. 2d 1062 (1989), but the en banc Court of Ap- peals affirmed the District Court's decision, 911 F. 2d 280 (CA9 1990) (en banc).

We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. --- (1991), to determine whether 6(b) violates the First Amendment. At oral argu- ment, doubts arose concerning the justiciability of that issue in the case before us. Having examined the complaint and the record, we hold that respondents have not demonstrated a live controversy ripe for resolution by the federal courts. As a consequence of our finding of nonjusticiability, we va- cate the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remand with instruc- tions to dismiss respondents' third cause of action.

II Concerns of justiciability go to the power of the federal courts to entertain disputes, and to the wisdom of their doing so. We presume that federal courts lack jurisdic- tion "unless `the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.' " Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986), quoting King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U.S. 225, 226 (1887). "It is the responsibility of the complainant clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dis- pute and the exercise of the court's remedial powers." Bender, supra, at 546, n. 8, quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-518 (1975).

A Proper resolution of the justiciability issues presented here requires examination of the pleadings and record to deter- mine the nature of the dispute and the interests of the parties in having it resolved in this judicial proceeding. According to the complaint, the respondent committee members "desire to endorse, support, and oppose candidates for city and county office through their county central committees, and to publicize such endorsements by having said endorsements printed in candidate's statements published in the voter's pamphlet." App. 4, 36. All respondents "desire to read endorsements of candidates for city and county office as part of candidate's statements printed in the San Francisco voter's pamphlet." Id., at 5, 37.

The complaint alleges that in the past certain of these peti- tioners "have deleted all references in candidate's statements for City and County offices to endorsements by political party central committees or officers or members of such com- mittees," and that they will continue such deletions in the fu- ture unless restrained by court order. 38. Respondents believe an actual controversy exists because they contend 6 and any other law relied upon to refuse to print the endorse- ments are unconstitutional in that they "abridge [respond- ents'] rights to free speech and association," while petitioners dispute these contentions. 39. The third cause of action concludes with general assertions that respondents have been harmed by the past and threatened deletion of endorse- ments from candidate statements, and that because of those deletions they have suffered and will suffer irreparable injury to their rights of free speech and association. Id., at 5-6, 40-41.

An affidavit submitted by the Chairman of the Republican Committee in connection with respondents' motion for sum- mary judgment illuminates and supplements the allegations of the complaint. It indicates the committee has a policy of endorsing candidates for nonpartisan offices:

"In 1987, the Republican Committee endorsed Arlo Smith for District Attorney, Michael Hennessey for Sheriff, and John Molinari for Mayor, despite objections from some that such endorsements are prohibited by California Constitution Article [II], Section 6. It is the plan and intention of the Republican Committee to en- dorse candidates for nonpartisan offices in as many fu- ture elections as possible. The Republican Committee would like to have such endorsements publicized by en- dorsed candidates in their candidate's statements in the San Francisco voter's pamphlet, and to encourage en- dorsed candidates to so publish their endorsements by the Republican Committee.

"In the future, I and other Republican Committee members . . . would like to use our titles as Republican County Committeemen in endorsements we make of local candidates which are printed in the San Francisco voter's pamphlet. We cannot do so as [petitioner] Jay Patterson has a policy of deleting the word `Republican' from all such endorsements." App. 15-16.

An affidavit submitted by a Democratic committeeman states that "[i]n elections since 1986, the Democratic Commit- tee has declined to endorse candidates for nonpartisan office solely out of concern that committee members may be crimi- nally or civilly prosecuted for violation of the endorsement ban contained in" 6. Id., at 12. It also provides two ex- amples of elections in which the word "Democratic" had been deleted from candidate statements. One involved an en- dorsement by a committee member of one of these respond- ents, then a candidate for local office, and in another the re- spondent committee member wished to mention that position in his own candidate statement. Ibid. Those elections oc- curred prior to the adoption of 6(b), but at least one and per- haps both were held at a time when a California appellate court had found a ban on party endorsements implicit in the state constitutional provision designating which offices are nonpartisan, now 6(a). See Unger v. Superior Court of Marin County, 102 Cal. App. 3d 681, 162 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1980), overruled by Unger v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 612, 692 P. 2d 238 (1984).

B Respondents' allegations indicate that, relevant to this suit, petitioners interpret 6(b) to apply to three different categories of speakers. First, as suggested by the language of the provision, it applies to party central committees. Sec- ond, petitioners' reliance on 6(b) to edit candidate state- ments demonstrates that they believe the provision applies as well to the speech of candidates for nonpartisan office, at least in the forum provided by the voter pamphlets. Third, petitioners have interpreted 6(b) to apply to members and officers of party central committees, as shown by their policy of deleting references to endorsements by these individuals from candidate statements. The first of these interpreta- tions flows from the plain language of 6(b), while the second and third require inferences from the text.

As an initial matter, serious questions arise concerning the standing of respondents to defend the rights of speak- ers in any of these categories except to the extent that cer- tain respondents in the third category may assert their own rights. In their capacity as voters, respondents only allege injury flowing from application of 6(b) to prevent speech by candidates in the voter pamphlets. We have at times permitted First Amendment claims by those who did not themselves intend to engage in speech, but instead wanted to challenge a restriction on speech they desired to hear. See, e. g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). There is reason to doubt, however, that the injury alleged by these voters can be redressed by a declaration of 6(b)'s invalidity or an injunction against its enforcement. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615-616 (1989) (opinion of Ken- nedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens and Scalia, JJ.) (party seeking to invoke authority of federal courts must show injury "likely to be redressed by the re- quested relief"); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("relief from the injury must be `likely' to follow from a favor- able decision"); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). A separate California statute, the constitutionality of which was not litigated in this case, pro- vides that a candidate's statement "shall not include the party affiliation of the candidate, nor membership or activity in partisan political organizations." Cal. Elec. Code Ann. 10012 (West 1977 and Supp. 1991). This statute might be construed to prevent candidates from mentioning party en- dorsements in voter pamphlets, even in the absence of 6(b). Overlapping enactments can be designed to further differing state interests, and invalidation of one may not impugn the validity of another.

The respondent committee members allege injury to their rights, either through their committees or as individual com- mittee members, to endorse candidates for nonpartisan of- fices, and also allege injury from the inability of candidates to include those endorsements in voter pamphlets. Respond- ents of course have standing to claim that 6(b) has been ap- plied in an unconstitutional manner to bar their own speech. Apart, though, from the possibility of an overbreadth chal- lenge, an alternative we discuss below, the standing of the committee members to litigate based on injuries to the rights of their respective committees is unsettled. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S., at 543-545 (school board member, as member of a "collegial body," could not take appeal board as a whole declined to take). It may be that rights the committee members can exercise only in conjunction with the other members of the committee must be defended by the committee itself. Nor is it clear, putting aside our concerns about redressability, that the committee members have third party standing to assert the rights of candidates, since no obvious barrier exists that would pre- vent a candidate from asserting his or her own rights. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. ---, --- (1991) (slip op., at 10).

C Justiciability concerns not only the standing of litigants to assert particular claims, but also the appropriate timing of judicial intervention. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 136-148 (1974). Respondents have failed to demonstrate a live dispute involving the actual or threatened application of 6(b) to bar particular speech. Respondents' generalized claim that petitioners have deleted party endorsements from candidate statements in past elec- tions does not demonstrate a live controversy. So far as we can discern from the record, those disputes had become moot by the time respondents filed suit. While the mootness exception for disputes capable of repetition yet evading re- view has been applied in the election context, see Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969), that doctrine will not revive a dispute which became moot before the action com- menced. "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive re- lief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-496 (1974); see Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

The allegation that the Democratic Committee has not en- dorsed candidates "[i]n elections since 1986" for fear of the consequences of violating 6, App. 12, provides insufficient indication of a controversy continuing at the time this litiga- tion began or arising thereafter. The affidavit provides no indication whom the Democratic Committee wished to en- dorse, for which office, or in what election. Absent a conten- tion that 6(b) prevented a particular endorsement, and that the controversy had not become moot prior to the litigation, this allegation will not support an action in federal court.

Nor can a ripe controversy be found in the fact that the Re- publican Committee endorsed candidates for nonpartisan elections in 1987, the year this suit was filed. Whether or not all of those endorsements involved elections pending at the time this action commenced, a point on which the affida- vit is not clear, we have no reason to believe that 6(b) had any impact on the conduct of those involved. The committee made these endorsements "despite objections from some that such endorsements are prohibited" by the provision at issue. App. 15. Nothing in the record suggests that any action was taken to enforce 6(b) as a result of those endorsements. We know of no adverse consequences suffered by the Repub- lican Committee or its members due to the apparent violation of 6(b). We also have no indication that any of the three endorsed candidates desired or attempted to include the par- ty's endorsement in a candidate statement.

We also discern no ripe controversy in the allegations that respondents desire to endorse candidates in future elections, either as individual committee members or through their committees. Respondents do not allege an intention to en- dorse any particular candidate, nor that a candidate wants to include a party's or committee member's endorsement in a candidate statement. We possess no factual record of an ac- tual or imminent application of 6(b) sufficient to present the constitutional issues in "clean-cut and concrete form." Res- cue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947); see Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972); Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111 (1962) (per curiam); Alabama Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945). We do not know the nature of the endorsement, how it would be publicized, or the pre- cise language petitioners might delete from the voter pam- phlet. To the extent respondents allege that a committee or a committee member wishes to "support" or "oppose" a can- didate other than through endorsements, they do not specify what form that support or opposition would take.

The record also contains no evidence of a credible threat that 6(b) will be enforced, other than against candidates in the context of voter pamphlets. The only instances disclosed by the record in which parties endorsed specific candidates did not, so far as we can tell, result in petitioners taking any enforcement action. While the record indicates that the Democratic Committee feared prosecution of its members if it endorsed a candidate, we find no explanation of what crimi- nal provision that conduct might be held to violate. Petition- ers' counsel indicated at oral argument that 6(b) carries no criminal penalties, and may only be enforced by injunction. Nothing in the record suggests that petitioners have threat- ened to seek an injunction against county committees or their members if they violate 6(b).

While petitioners have threatened not to allow candidates to include endorsements by county committees or their mem- bers in the voter pamphlets prepared by the government, we do not believe deferring adjudication will impose a substan- tial hardship on these respondents. In all probability, respondents can learn which candidates have been endorsed by particular parties or committee members through other means. If respondents or their committees do desire to make a particular endorsement in the future, and a candidate wishes to include the endorsement in a voter pamphlet, the constitutionality of petitioners' refusal to publish the en- dorsement can be litigated in the context of a concrete dispute.

Postponing consideration of the questions presented, until a more concrete controversy arises, also has the advantage of permitting the state courts further opportunity to construe 6(b), and perhaps in the process to "materially alter the question to be decided." Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989) (plurality opinion). It is not clear from the language of the provision, for in- stance, that it applies to individual members of county com- mittees. This apparent construction of the provision by peti- tioners, which may give respondents standing in this case, could be held invalid by the state courts. State courts also may provide further definition to 6(b)'s operative language, "endorse, support, or oppose." "Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function." Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954).

D We conclude with a word about the propriety of resolving the facial constitutionality of 6(b) without first addressing its application to a particular set of facts. In some First Amendment contexts, we have permitted litigants injured by a particular application of a statute to assert a facial over- breadth challenge, one seeking invalidation of the statute be- cause its application in other situations would be unconstitu- tional. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). We have some doubt that respondents' complaint should be construed to assert a facial challenge to 6(b). Beyond ques- tion, the gravamen of the complaint is petitioners' application of 6(b) to delete party endorsements from candidate state- ments in voter pamphlets. While the complaint seeks a dec- laration of 6(b)'s unconstitutionality, the only injunctive relief it requests relates to the editing of candidate state- ments. References to other applications of 6(b) are at best conclusory.

But even if one may read the complaint to assert a facial challenge, the better course might have been to address in the first instance the constitutionality of 6(b) as applied in the context of voter pamphlets. "It is not the usual judicial practice, . . . nor do we consider it generally desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily -- that is, be- fore it is determined that the statute would be valid as ap- plied. Such a course would convert use of the overbreadth doctrine from a necessary means of vindicating the plaintiff's right not to be bound by a statute that is unconstitutional into a means of mounting gratuitous wholesale attacks upon state and federal laws." Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-485 (1989); see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-504 (1985). If the as-applied challenge had been resolved first in this case, the problems of justiciability that determine our disposition might well have concluded the litigation at an earlier stage.

III The free speech issues argued in the briefs filed here have fundamental and far-reaching import. For that very reason, we cannot decide the case based upon the amorphous and ill- defined factual record presented to us. Rules of justiciabil- ity serve to make the judicial process a principled one. Were we to depart from those rules, our disposition of the case would lack the clarity and force which ought to inform the exercise of judicial authority.

The judgment is vacated and the case remanded with in- structions to dismiss respondents' third cause of action with- out prejudice.